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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LISA MARAKIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,

Case No. 20855

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondent disputes the issue framed by appellant.
Respondent respectfully submits that the issue is whether the
physical contact requirement in the contract of uninsured
motorist insurance between State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
(respondent) and Lisa Marakis (appellant) is consistent with
legislative intent and public policy of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not refer to the
record on appeal in support of numerous allegations.

Respondent

submits that the appellant's recitation of facts fails to
accurately reflect the record presented to Judge Bunnell in the

court below.

Therefore, respondent will provide the court with

a Statement of Facts supported by the record.
However, one issue should be addressed at the outset.
Appellant in her Statement of Facts goes to considerable
lengths in describing the trial court's granting of a Rule
60(b) motion which set aside a prior order granting Marakis'
motion for summary judgment.

In reciting these facts to the

court here, the appellant appears to criticize the attorneys
for defendant as well as the court.

Because no error has been

assigned on this ground, respondents would ignore the allegations, but for the apparent criticism of the trial court in
"surprisingly" granting respondent's motion pursuant to Rule
6 0(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In support of

Judge Bunnell's ruling in this regard, it should be noted that
his exercise of discretion was supported by the fact that
defense counsel had not become personally aware of plaintiff's
pending motion prior to the granting of the initial order and
that defendant's two attorneys had tried seven multi-dayed
personal injury trials during the critical six week period when
the motion was pending.

The court was further informed that

during this period of time, counsel for both parties to this
appeal were involved in a trial for several days, and that
appellant's counsel declined professional comity in personally
informing defense counsel of his attempts to obtain a judgment
without the court being fully briefed on the issues.

(Affida-

vits of Ray Harding Ivie and Ray Phillips Ivie, R. 85-90).
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The

court ruled on defendant's motion to reconsider on July 11,
1985. (R. 149-152).

Defendant's lead counsel retired from the

practice of law six weeks later due to health problems.
Appellant claimed coverage in the court below pursuant
to a contract of insurance between her grandparents and respondent.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 155-158).
The policy of insurance between appellant's grand-

parents and respondent provided for payment of damages for
bodily injury that an insured is legally entitled to collect
from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle.

The

policy defined uninsured motor vehicle to mean:
A 'hit-and-run' land motor vehicle whose
owner or driver remains unknown and which
strikes:
a. the insured or
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying
and causes bodily injury to the insured,
(emphasis added)
Appellant made claim to uninsured motorist benefits
alleging that she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on
or about September 4, 1982.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 1-3).

Appellant alleged that the accident occurred when her
vehicle was forced from the road by an unidentified vehicle
which the appellant further alleged left the scene of the
accident.

(Affidavit of Plaintiff Lisa Marakis, R. 45-46).
That the only evidence which appellant could profer

as to the existence of the unidentified vehicle would be the
testimony of the appellant herself.
Conclusions of Law, R. 155-158).
-3-

(Findings of Fact and

The respondent insurance company admits that Lisa
Marakis, appellant, as a permissive user of the insured automobile is an insured pursuant to the contract of insurance.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The issue presented concerns the enforceability of
the "physical contact requirement" as a condition precedent to
an insurer's duty to indemnify an insured for damages sustained
as the proximate result of negligence by a "hit-and-run"
motorist.

Appellant has never contended that the policy

language is anything but clear and unequivocal in this regard.
Rather, appellant seeks in this court and in the court below,
to have the provision rendered unenforceable.

Appellant's

arguments are founded on legislative intent and public policy
rationales.

Therefore, the issues presented to the Supreme

Court here are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court correctly discern the legis-

lature's intent in using the term "hit-and-run"; and
2.

Was the trial court correct in its determination

that the public policy of the State of Utah requires the courts
to enforce the provision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PRESENT APPEAL IS MOOT
In the court below, Judge Bunnell was asked to determine the legislature's intent in using the phrase "hit-and-run"
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in Section 41-12-21.1, Utah Code Annotated, (Utah's Uninsured
Motorist Statute).

At the time of Judge Bunnell's decision,

the legislature had not defined the scope or breadth of that
term.

However, the 1986 legislature specifically addressed the

physical contact rule.

In so doing, the legislature clarified

their legislative intent in enacting the Uninsured Motorist
Statute, and adopted as the public policy of the State of Utah
a rule consistent with the one applied by Judge Bunnell in the
present case. The new statutory language provides:
When a covered person claims an uninsured
motor vehicle under subsection (2)(b) (an
unidentified motor vehicle which left the
scene of an accident proximately caused by
its operator) proximately caused an accident
without touching the covered person or the
vehicle occupied by the covered person,
then the covered person shall show the
existence of the other motor vehicle by
clear and convincing evidence, which shall
consist of more than the covered person's
testimony. (Precise citation still uncertain.
The above-quoted statutory language contained
a working citation of 31A-22-305(5). A
copy of the language as contained in Senate
Bill 91 is included in respondent's brief
and attached as Appendix A.)
The above-quoted statutory language is entirely
consistent with Judge Bunnell's ruling in the present case.
The legislature has now adopted as the public policy of the
State of Utah a moderate position which balances the competing
interests which are reflected in the opinions of the various
states which have reviewed the physical contact requirement.
The Utah statute permits recovery by an insured only where the
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existence of the phantom vehicle is established by clear and
convincing proof, which must consist of more than the covered
person's testimony.

However, the legislature had also recog-

nized the possibility of fraud and collusion, as well as the
difficulties inherent in defending actions arising out of
automobile accidents involving non-contact "phantom vehicles",
and of thus excluded mandatory coverage for such accidents in
those instances where the existence of the phantom vehicle
cannot be established by more than the covered person's testimony*
In the present case, the trial court specifically
entered a finding of fact concerning this issue of proof.
court stated in paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact:
That the only person known to plaintiff who
witnessed the motor vehicle accident is the
plaintiff herself. (Plaintiff's Responses
to Defendant's Interrogatories, R. 25-26).
Furthermore, plaintiff-appellant was asked the
following question in interrogatories:
15. Q: Please list the name, address and
telephone number of each and every individual
which plaintiff may or will call as a
witness at the trial of this matter.
The plaintiff/appellant responded:
ANSWER: Presently, plaintiff plans to call
the following people as witnesses. Names
of others will be provided as they are
determined:

-6-

The

1) Lisa Marakis, as to the facts of
the accident, injuries, damages;
2) Dr. Kim Christensen, East Carbon
Medical Clinic, East Carbon, UT 84520, as
to injuries and damages;
3) Harold Jay Fowler, 108 8th West
(Box 318) East Carbon, UT 84520, as to
policy of insurance and damages and
injuries;
4) Mary Fowler, 108 8th West (Box
318) East Carbon, UT 84520, as to policy of
insurance and damages and injuries.
(Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's
Interrogatories, R. 25-26) .
As the responses to interrogatories indicate, the
only person capable of testifying as to the existence of the
non-contact vehicle is the plaintiff herself.

The legislature

has clarified the public policy underlying the Uninsured
Motorist Statute in specifying that such proof will not be
sufficient to establish a right to collect pursuant to a policy
of insurance issued to satisfy the requirements of Utah's
Uninsured Motorist Statute.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the candid
observation of appellant in her brief on appeal.

On page 8 of

appellant's brief, she sets forth the various type of uninsured
motorist statutes enacted by the several states.

Appellant

states therein:
The fourth, and most progressive, category
consists of four states which allow the
physical contact requirement to be waived
if competent evidence exists to corroborate
the claimant's account of the accident.
(Appellant's Brief on Appeal, page 8 ) .
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State Farm does not dispute the extension of coverage
to non-contact accidents where the existence of the fleeing
vehicle can be sufficiently established.

The physical contact

requirement has been adopted not only by insurance companies in
language contained in insurance contracts, but also by the
legislatures or courts of the majority of states that have
addressed the issue.

However, the rationale behind the require-

ment must be examined.

The purpose for requiring physical

contact is not to provide an arbitrary gap in insurance coverage.
Rather, it is to effectuate the public policy of stabilizing
the rising costs of automobile insurance by preventing fraudulent claims as well as barring those actions which are nearly
impossible to defend due to the lack of physical evidence found
at the scene of the accident.

However, where the existence of

the phantom vehicle can be conclusively determined by evidence
consisting of more than the testimony of the insured themselves,
the rationale ceases to exist and coverage should be afforded.
To this extent, State Farm would agree with Marakis
that a more progressive rule is emerging in the various states.
While the original cases to be decided on this issue were
polarized in terms of upholding the requirement or striking it
down, the new moderate rule would preclude recovery in cases
like the present one, but would permit claims where there is no
serious question as to the presence of the non-contact accident.
In the present case, the trial court was faced with a
difficult task of discerning legislative intent where the
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legislature was silent as to the definition of "hit-and-run"
motor vehicles.

The legislature has now clarified its position

and adopted a public policy consistent with the trial court's
decision in the present case.

The new legislative directive

serves to clarify this ambiguity in a way which serves the
purposes of the general public in stabilizing the rising costs
of automobile insurance, while at the same time permitting
recovery in those circumstances which justify it.

The legisla-

ture having now spoken, and the trial court's ruling being
consistent therewith, respondent would respectfully submit that
the issue is now moot.
POINT II
THE PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT CONTAINED
IN THE POLICY OF INSURANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE
PUBLIC POLICY, AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED
ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
While respondent maintains that the recent clarification by the Utah State Legislature has rendered the present
appeal moot, the construction urged by appellant would be
erroneous, even in the absence of the legislative directive.
Initially, it must be remembered that a policy of
insurance constitutes a contract, which should be enforced
according to its terms unless it violates state law, principles
of equity, or public policy.

This rule of construction was

articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in a previous case
concerning the Uninsured Motorist Statute, Martin v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294 (1969).

There the court stated :
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There appears to be no ambiguity or uncertainty in the provision just quoted,
(prohibition against stacking of uninsured
motorist policies) It being thus set forth
as part of the insurance contract, in clear
and understandable terms . . . it is the
duty of the courts to give it effect. This
is true unless considerations of equity and
justice, or of public policy, dictate that
the contract should not be enforced because
of fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability,
illegality or some other some cogent
reason. (Martin v. Christensen, supra., at
p. 295) .
Under the standard of review enunciated in Martin v.
Christensen, supra., the threshold question which must be
addressed is whether or not the policy exclusion is stated
clearly and unambiguously.

This issue was apparently conceded

by appellant in the court below.

The contract language clearly

requires a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle to "strike" the insured
or the vehicle the insured is occupying as a condition precedent
to respondent's duty to perform under the Uninsured Motorist
Provision of the contract.
Appellant contends that the term "hit-and-run" as
used in the Uninsured Motorist Statute is ambiguous to the
extent that it does not define whether physical contact must
occur to constitute a "hitting".

However, while the legislature

failed to define the term until the 1986 session, the term has
been defined in the contract of insurance to require a "striking".
No argument is issued by appellant that the definition in the
contract is ambiguous.

Rather, they urge that the ambiguity in

the statute should be resolved in their favor and that this
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court should therefore hold that the policy fails to meet the
statutory directive. While the legislative intent is no longer
ambiguous, State Farm maintains that the construction urged by
appellant would be erroneous even in the absence of the legislative directive.
Initially, State Farm would invite the court to
examine the logic of appellantfs argument.

Marakis maintains

that Utah law concerning vehicles leaving the scene of an
accident, imposes criminal responsibility without the requirement of physical contact.

Marakis therefore maintains that

this court should construe the Uninsured Motorist Statute to
apply in the same situations which would impose criminal
liability.
Respondent respectfully maintains that this logic is
fallacious.

An examination of the criminal statute cited by

Marakis indicates that the legislature knew how to select
appropriate terms in imposing legal duties based upon automobile accidents which did not involve physical contact.
However, in the case of the Uninsured Motorist Statute, the
legislature did not refer to Section 41-6-29, nor did the
legislature use the term "involved in an accident", as they did
in the criminal statute.

Rather, they used the term "hit-

and-run" .
Respondent would respectfully maintain that the fact
that the legislature selected different terms indicates that
the legislature intended the two status to apply to different
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situations.

To this extent, it is of course important to note

that the term "hit" as used in the statute carries with it an
obvious implication of physical contact.

The Wisconsin Supreme

Court articulated this position in the case of Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co,, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983).

There the court

stated:
When statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we must arrive at the legislature 's intention by according the
language its ordinary and accepted meaning,
(citation omitted) In addition, we will
not resort to extrinsic aids, such as
legislative history, to construe the
statute when the statute is clear on its
face. (citation omitted)
We conclude that the statutory language of
sec. 632.32(4)(a)2b. Stats*, is unambiguous.
We therefore arrive at the legislature's
intent by according the language its common
and accepted meaning. (citation omitted)
As previously noted, the common and accepted
meaning of the term 'hit-and-run' includes
an element of physical contact. (Hayne v.
Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra., pp.
590-591).
The Wisconsin court went on to state:
Hayne (plaintiff) nevertheless argues that
the term 'hit-and-run' . . . is not synonymous
with physical contact. He cites two
dictionary definitions and a decision from
another jurisdiction to support his assertion
that hit-and-run simply means an automobile
involved in an accident, after which the
driver flees the accident scene.
We find his argument unpersuasive. The
dictionary definitions we previously cited
uniformly indicate that 'hit-and-run'
includes two elements: a 'hit' or striking,
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and a 'run', or fleeing from the accident
scene. (Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins.
Co., supra., p. 591).
The Wisconsin court further indicated that ignoring
the term "hit" would violate traditional principles of statutory
construction.

The court stated at page 591:

Statutes must be construed, if possible, so
that no word or clause is rendered surplusage,
(citation omitted) If the legislature had
intended its mandated uninsured motorist
coverage to apply to any accident involving
an unidentified motorist, as Hayne asserts,
that result could have been reached merely
by deleting the term 'hit-and-run' from the
language in (the statute), and having that
provision read: 'an unidentified motor
vehicle involved in an accident'. (Hayne
v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra.,
p. 591).
The Utah legislature has now done exactly what the
Wisconsin court suggested.

They have specifically defined

limited class of cases which may be pursued where physical
contact is absent.

However, in interpreting the prior statute,

the persuasive logic of the Wisconsin court remains clear.

It

should not be assumed that the Utah legislature used the term
"hit" when they meant something else.

The more persuasive

argument is that if they had intended uninsured motorist
coverage to apply in situations where no physical contact
existed, they could have used terms such as that in the new
legislative amendment, the criminal statutes cited by appellant,
or the language referred to by the Wisconsin court.
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Finally, the court in Hayne, supra., takes appellant's
argument one step further.

Not only must we assume that the

legislature was aware of the language used in other statutes
(and that such language could be used in the present statutes),
but we may also assume that the legislature is aware of a
standard policy exclusion which is contained in nearly every
policy of uninsured motorist insurance.

The Hayne, supra.,

court continued at page 595:
It is reasonable to assume that if the
legislature was aware of the standard
policy provision defining uninsured motor
vehicle to include one involved in a
1
hit-and-run' accident, it was also aware
of the standard policy provision defining
'hit-and-run1 to include a physical contact
requirement. (Hayne v. Progressive
Northern Ins. Co., supra., p. 595).
The Utah legislature's recent amendment clearly
demonstrates that they are aware of the physical contact
requirement, and believe that the requirement is proper except
where the purpose of the requirement disappears.
Finally, Marakis maintains that the exclusion is void
as against public policy.

Once again, respondent would maintain

that the elected representatives of the Utah citizenry have
articulated Utah's public policy on this issue and the recent
amendment to the statute.

Furthermore, the traditional meaning

of the term "hit-and-run" as used in the Uninsured Motorist
Statute would indicate that the legislature previously adopted
the physical contact rule as Utah's public policy.
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No argument

has been stated that the legislature's directives in this
regard are constitutionally repugnant.

State Farm would

respectfully maintain that the legislature having balanced the
considerations inherent in the question, and having articulated
a physical contact requirement, that the court should give
effect to the language.
However, State Farm would also address Marakis'
characterization of the "majority rule" of our sister states on
this issue.

Appellant has gone to great efforts in an attempt

to manufacturer a majority.

In doing so, Marakis has been

forced to divide the statutory schemes of the various states
into four categories. The appellant then identifies one
category, consisting of nine states, and applies that category
to Utah's legislative scheme.
Initially, it must be noted that in light of the
clarification provided by the 1986 legislature, Utah no longer
fits within the category assigned to it by appellant in her
brief.

The legislature in clarifying the statutes now places

Utah within the fourth category identified by Marakis, in term
the "most progressive" in appellant's brief.
However, the manufacturing of a majority by segregation
into statutory categories must receive further examination.

As

State Farm has previously indicated, the requirement is unambiguous in its terms, and is consistent with both the Uninsured
Motorist Statute and the recent amendments providing clarification concerning the physical contact requirement.
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Therefore,

the only remaining question is whether or not the requirement
is so repugnant as to violate public policy, and under the Utah
Supreme Court's standard stated in Martin v. Christensen,
supra., would require the language to be ignored by the courts.
In this regard, we should look beyond Marakis' categorizations
of the various states. When we do this, we find that the
majority of jurisdictions, either by legislative act or court
determination, have embraced the physical contact requirement.
Specifically, a state by state analysis shows that twenty-two
states have adopted the physical contact requirement without
exception.

Another four states enforce the requirement except

where clear and convincing corroborative evidence of the
existence of the unidentified motor vehicle is present.
Conversely, a minority of eighteen states permit recovery in
the absence of physical contact.

Only thirteen of the fifty

states have permitted recovery without physical contact through
judicial determination.

Respondent is aware of no state court

that has struck down an unambiguous legislative determination
on the issue.
It is therefore clear that the majority of jurisdictions have not only found that the physical contact requirement
does not violate public policy, but that indeed the requirement
has been embraced as the public policy of the majority of
states.

Clearly then, the requirement does not reach the level

of repugnance to equity and public policy referred to in Martin
v. Christensen, supra.
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Furthermore, while appellant has attempted to create
a majority by categorizing other jurisdictions' decisions on
the issue, they ignore the fact that few of the courts that
have permitted recovery without physical contact have gone so
far as the appellant urges the Utah court to go in this instance.
Professor Alan I. Widiss in his 1985 treatise on uninsured
motorist insurance, analyses the decisions requiring coverage
as follows:
Appellate cases which have allowed recovery
when there was no physical contact could be
grouped in several categories:
(1) Decisions that extend the indirect
contact doctrine (an example of this
doctrine would be rocks kicked up by the
wheels of a passing motorist);
(2) Decisions that mitigate the effect of
the 'physical contact' requirement by
making its satisfaction a question of fact;
and
(3) Decisions that invalidate the 'physical
contact' requirement.
(A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured
Motorist Insurance, Section 9.6, 2nd
Edition, 1985).
Therefore, in viewing the split of opinion between
the various states, it is important to note that even the
minority of states have in most instances refused to go to the
extreme that plaintiff urges in the present case.

By plain-

tiff's own admission, there was no "indirect contact" with the
unidentified vehicle.

Second, there is no "fact question"

which would allow the jury to determine whether or not physical
contact indeed occurred.
-17-

Because it is clear from an examination of appellant's
brief that the majority of states have adopted the physical
contact requirement through legislative or judicial action,
respondent would refrain from excessive quotations from the
statutes and case law of our sister states.

However, for the

benefit of the court, respondent attaches to the present brief
as "Appendix B", citations to authorities in other jurisdictions which have upheld the physical contact requirement.
Finally, respondent would stress that important
public policy considerations support the physical contact
requirement as applied by the Utah state legislature.

The

legislature in several instances has indicated that it is the
public policy of this state to effectuate a stabilization of
automobile insurance.

This court need not take judicial notice

of the present "insurance crisis" which confronts the insurance
consumer.

That fact has been recognized by our legislature on

many occasions.

It is respectfully submitted that the legisla-

ture's delicate balancing has been proper in this instance.
The physical contact rule will not bar claims where the existence of the unidentified vehicle can be clearly established.
However, because of the possibility of fraudulent claims, but
particularly the difficulties in defending actions where the
only witness would be the plaintiff herself, the costs of such
coverage could be expected to skyrocket.

Naturally, as insu-

rance costs increase, the number of people who elect to go
without insurance would also be expected to multiply.
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This is

particularly so in states like Utah which permit motorists to
elect not to carry uninsured motorist protection.
Obviously, it is the public policy of the State of
Utah to provide insurance coverage for the innocent victims of
tort feasors. However, that purpose will be frustrated if the
costs of insurance protection becomes so prohibitive that more
and more members of our populace are forced by economic constraints to go without insurance.

Faced with such a dilemma, it

is respectfully submitted that the legislature may properly
exercise its function by balancing the policy favoring compensation for tort victims with the very real concern that to
provide coverage for every possible instance of injury will
make insurance costs so prohibitive that many citizens will be
completely unprotected.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's
determination as applied to the facts of this case is consistent
with the legislative intent evidenced by the original Uninsured
Motorist Statute, as well as the amendments provided by the
1986 legislature.

Furthermore, respondent would contend that

the legislature has balanced competing public policy concerns
and has adopted as the public policy of this state a fair and
rational rule which permits for indemnification and appropriate
circumstances while barring those claims which threaten to
place the costs of insurance beyond the means of the citizenry.
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial court,
correctly discerning legislative intent and rejecting an
overbroad public policy argument, properly enforced the contract
between the parties.

The fact that this case presents a

question of contracts should be of no small consequence.

As

the Arizona court indicated in the case of Lawrence v.
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 446 (1968):
We find nothing misleading or ambiguous
about the wording used in both policies to
define 'hit-and-run automobile' or in
setting out the requirement of physical
contact. If we ignore or do away with the
physical contact requirement we would be
rewriting the contract between these
parties, and would be rendering the phrase
'hit-and-run' meaningless. 'Hit' in the
ordinary sense requires some 'physical
contact.' If this were not the case, and
if we hold that no contact is required,
then we would be rewriting the policy to
have it contain 'miss-and-run automobile1
coverage, or 'evasive action' coverage. We
cannot expand the language used beyond its
plain and ordinary meaning, nor should we
add something to the contract which the
parties have not put there. (Lawrence v.
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co./
supra., p. 449) .
The trial court having properly discerned legislative
intent, having properly applied the public policy of the State
of Utah, and having given force and effect to the clear and
unambiguous requirements of the contract, respondent would
respectfully request affirmance of its order granting summary
judgment.

-20-

DATED AND SIGNED t h i s

ty

IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for
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Respondent

"APPENDIX A"
S. B. No. 91

(5)

When a covered person claims

Subsection

[{3*)]

(2)

an

uninsured

motor

vehicle

under

(b) proximately caused an accident without touching

the covered person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, then

the

covered person shall show the existence of the other motor vehicle by clear
and

convincing

evidence,

which

shall

consist

of more than the covered

person* s testimony.
[{6}—Hninsared-motorist-eoverage-may-not-be-eonstroed—to—require—an
insurer?—as—to—any—one-poiieyj-to-pay-more-than-one-per-person-coverage
iimit-to-any-one-eevered-persony-nor-to-pay—more—than—the—aggregate—or
singie-iimit-coverage-iimits-in-connection-with-any-one-aeeident-]
(6)

In

no

event

shall the limit of liability for uninsured motorist

coverage for two or more motor vehicles be
stacked

to

determine

the

limit

of

injured person for any one accident.
available

to

an

added

insurance
If

or

motorist

coverage

is

injured person under more than one insurance policy, the

motorist

benefits.

Claimants

are

he
not

subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under
Section 158.

combined,

coverage available to an

uninsured

injured person shall elect the policy under which
uninsured

together,

desires

to

collect

barred against making
previous

elections*

Section 31A-22-306, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted

by Chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1985, is^amended to read:
31A-22-306 (Effective 07/01/86).
Subsection

31A-22-302

described under Section
31A-22-308,

but

[43-)]

(2)

31A-22-307

Personal
provides
to

the

persons

injury

protection

coverages
described

under

and

benefits

under

Section

is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions
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